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Doctrinal Conversation: Justice Kagan’s Supreme Court
Opinions
LAURA KRUGMAN RAY *
Confirmation hearings are sometimes memorable for their moments of high
drama, as in Clarence Thomas’s fiery attack on the Senate Judiciary Committee, 1 or
apparent blunders, as in Robert Bork’s seeming rejection of a major Supreme Court
desegregation decision, 2 or flashes of human emotion, as in Martha-Ann Alito’s
tearful departure after her husband was asked a provocative question. 3 In contrast,
Elena Kagan’s confirmation hearing is likely to be remembered for something quite
different: the nominee’s humorous comments that the transcript repeatedly records
as followed by “[Laughter.]” 4 When, in a lead-in to a question about an attempted
terrorist attack, South Carolina Republican Senator Lindsey Graham asked Kagan
where she was on Christmas Day, she famously replied “You know, like all Jews, I
was probably at a Chinese Restaurant.” 5 Graham, presumably startled, was
nonetheless appreciative, responding “Great answer. Great answer,” before
returning to his serious theme. 6
Kagan’s humorous comments were not simply isolated jokes intended to lighten
the hearing’s atmosphere. They served as well to build bridges between the
nominee and her examiners, to inject a human element into what at times showed
signs of becoming an adversarial process, and to create a rapport with observers as
well as Judiciary Committee members of both parties. Questioned about her law
review article calling for substantive exchanges between senators and Supreme
Court nominees, Kagan was quick to acknowledge the tension between that article
and her reticence in providing specific answers. When Senator Patrick Leahy noted
of the article that “[y]ou probably reread those words,” Kagan replied “Many times.
. . . And you know what? They have been read back to me many times.” 7 Asked by
Senator Grassley about a thesis she wrote as a student at Oxford University, Kagan
was candidly ironic: “Senator Grassley,” she replied, “all I can say about that paper
is that it’s – it’s dangerous to write papers about the law before you’ve spent a day

† Copyright © Laura Krugman Ray 2013.
* Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law; J.D., Ph.D., Yale University;
A.B., Bryn Mawr College. I am grateful to Jean Eggen and Philip Ray for their valuable
comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. Jane Mayer & Jill Abramson, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF CLARENCE
THOMAS 289–90 (1994).
2. Ethan Bronner, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA
232–33 (1989).
3. Neil A. Lewis, Court in Transition: In the Background; An Intense Experience for
Family Members, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2006, at A27.
4. 23 Hearings and Reports on Successful and Unsuccessful Nominations of Supreme
Court Justices by the Senate Judiciary Committee 1916-2010, at 62, 79, 88, 95, 118, 128,
136, 144, 208, 262, 266, 277, 281, 292.
5. Id. at 144.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 62.
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in law school.” 8 Toward the close of her second and final day of testimony, when
Senator Coburn prefaced a question by noting that “I’m 12 or 13 years older than
you,” Kagan responded “Maybe not after this hearing.” 9 And when Senator
Klobuchar intervened briefly to correct a point she had made only minutes earlier
about the number of women senators elected in past years, Kagan was quick to
sympathize. “Isn’t email a wonderful thing,” she said. “You can learn you’re wrong
right away.” 10 It is not surprising that even Senator Arlen Specter, who earlier
scolded Kagan for evading his questions, ended by complimenting her. 11 “You
have shown a really admirable sense of humor,” he told her. “I think that is really
important.” 12
Kagan’s tendency to lower the temperature of an inherently adversarial situation
by connecting with her audience has not been confined to her confirmation hearing.
It has become as well a hallmark of her opinions. Whether she is writing for the
Court, concurring, or dissenting, Kagan’s style is remarkably conversational. She
employs a range of rhetorical strategies to speak directly to the reader, suggesting
that her enterprise is less indoctrination than a more congenial mode of persuasion.
Leavening her legal prose with colloquial diction, she engages the reader in
something approaching an informational, if one-sided, chat. I have elsewhere
characterized Justice Scalia’s distinctive rhetorical style as “indignant
conversation,” speaking to the reader in the voice of “a man of common sense
whose patience is tried beyond endurance by the follies of his colleagues.” 13
Kagan’s variety of conversation is quite different in tone: genial rather than
indignant, seeking to enlighten rather than to chastise those who disagree with her.
Her judicial prose might aptly be called friendly pedagogy, an approach that seems
to offer the reader a glimpse of the author as she once was in her professorial role.
This similarity is scarcely surprising. Kagan herself has said that “I approach
opinion writing much as I used to approach the classroom,” 14 and her judicial prose
contains numerous strategies of engagement between author and reader that recall
the strategies of a gifted teacher.
More than two dozen times in her first two terms on the Court, Kagan opens a
sentence with a direct invocation to the reader, much as a teacher addresses her
students. Sometimes the opening is a simple “Recall” or “Remember,” to prompt

8. Id. at 128.
9. Id. at 281.
10. Id. at 292.
11. For example, dissatisfied with Kagan’s response to his question about the deference
owed by the Court to Congress, Specter interrupted her reply: “Ms. Kagan, I know what you
said. You have talked about that a great deal. My question is very pointed. Wasn’t that
disrespectful?” When she tried again to respond, he again interrupted her: “I’m going to
move on. I know all of that. The point that I’m trying to find out from you is what deference
you would show to Congressional fact finding.” Id. at 132.
12. Id. at 136.
13. Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Personality: Rhetoric and Emotion in Supreme Court
Opinions, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 193, 227 (2002).
14. Interview with Dean Wendy Purdue, University of Richmond School of Law,
September 20, 2012. http://www.c-span.org/Events/Conversation-with-Supreme-CourtJustice-Elena-Kagan/10737434240-1/.
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the reader’s memory about the facts of the case or an argument made by the other
side. 15 At other times she asks a bit more of the reader: to consider a different slant
on an issue or suppose an invented situation. That may take the basic form of a
simple request, like “Consider first” 16 or “Consider a prosaic example.” 17 Or it may
place a heavier demand, asking the reader to go beyond the facts of the case to
examine a hypothetical sequence of events (“First suppose. . . . But now suppose. . .
.”). 18 That demand may become quite personal, as when she asks the reader to
“[s]uppose your spouse tells you that he got lost because he ‘did not make a
turn.’” 19 She may even offer directions for the mental process required, as when
she asks the reader to “[p]ut on blinders” and then later “take off” those
blinders, 20or when she commands “[b]ut now stop a moment” to reflect on the
importance of context in interpreting the phrase “not an.” 21 She may ask for an
even greater leap, instructing the reader to “Imagine” 22 or, more precisely, to
“Pretend.” The latter injunction introduces a detailed exchange with the reader in
Kagan’s dissent from the majority’s rejection of a campaign finance matching fund
provision as unconstitutional:
Pretend you are financing your campaign through private donations.
Would you prefer that your opponent receive a guaranteed, upfront
payment of $150,000, or that he receive only $50,000, with the
possibility a possibility that you mostly get to control - of collecting
another $100,000 somewhere down the road? Me too. That’s the first
reason the burden on speech cannot command a different result in this
case than in Buckley. 23
Kagan puts the reader in the shoes of the candidate whose own expenditures would
determine the size of the matching payments to his opponent. Her colloquial two

15. See, e.g., “Recall that the FMIA’s regulations provide for the inspection of all pigs
at delivery,” Nat’l Meat Ass’n. v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 971 (2012); “Remember: Indiana
has made a purposeful choice to divide the full spectrum of vehicular flight into different
degrees,” Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2292 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
16. “Consider first what the two statutes tell a slaughterhouse to do . . . ,” Nat’l Meat,
132 S. Ct. at 970.
17. “Consider a prosaic example not involving scientific experts,” Williams v. Illinois,
132 S. Ct. 2221, 2269 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
18. “First, suppose Patchak had sued under the APA claiming that he owned the Bradley
Property . . . . But now suppose that Patchak had sued under the APA claiming only that use
of the Bradley Property was causing environmental harm,” Match-E-Be-She-Wish Band of
Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (2012).
19. Caraco Pharm. Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1681 (2012).
20. “Put on blinders, and the subsection is naturally understood to address all flight, up
to and including the most dangerous kinds. But take off those blinders – view the statute as a
whole – and the subsection is instead seen to target failures to stop. Sykes, 132 S. Ct. at 2293.
21. Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1681.
22. “Imagine the converse of the statute described above,” Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2291
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
23. Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2838
(2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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word agreement with the anticipated answer – “Me too” – draws dissenter and
reader into a friendly alliance before she caps the argument with the authority of
precedent.
Kagan may also, at times, go beyond these one-size-fits-all instructions to single
out or even flatter her readers, a strategy of classroom encouragement. When she
observes that “[c]areful readers may note …,” she is focusing her readers’ attention
by complimenting their powers of observation. 24 And in the same case she then
observes that “[t]hose mathematically inclined might think of the comparablegrounds approach as employing Venn diagrams,” drawing those eager to accept the
compliment into a visual image used to illustrate a statutory provision. 25 In the
inverse of that flattery, she may instead encourage her readers to question the
resolution of a technical issue involving scientific test results by providing them
with a more accessible approach. Dissenting from a Court opinion accepting
laboratory evidence without the testimony of the technician involved, Kagan
substitutes a simple analogy. “Consider a prosaic example,” she asks, in which a
police officer testifies to what an absent eyewitness told him, suggesting that
common sense rather than technical expertise is sufficient to undermine the
majority’s position. 26
Kagan enhances the conversational quality of her opinions with a generous
sprinkling of informal and even colloquial diction, speaking in the language of her
readers much as a teacher might speak in the language of her students. Writing for a
unanimous Court in her first term, she puts her own stamp on a brief opinion by
referring to a “faux complaint” made against a police chief, 27 a “downright lucky
assertion” of a claim, 28 and “green-eyeshade accountants.” 29 In subsequent
opinions she has characterized an amicus’ argument as “a kind of loosey-goosey
caution not to put too much faith in the capacity of prisons to rehabilitate,” 30
reported an increase in campaign expenditures of “a whopping 253%,” 31 rejected a
claimed injury as barred “[e]xcept in a world gone topsy-turvy,” 32 and become the
second Justice to use the word “chutzpah.” 33 She rejects a plurality opinion that in
her view would have allowed an easy evasion of the Constitution as “a wink and a
nod.” 34 Expanding her point, she argues in a conversational voice: “If the
Confrontation Clause prevents the State from getting its evidence in through the

24. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 482 n.4 (2011).
25. Id. at 482.
26. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2269 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
27. Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2211 (2011).
28. Id. at 2215-16.
29. Id. at 2216.
30. Tapia v. United States, 131 U.S. 2382, 2387 (2011) (Kagan, J.).
31. Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2834
n.2 (2011).
32. Id. at 2833.
33. “Some people might call that chutzpah.” Id. at 2835 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The first
to use the word was Justice Scalia, referring to “a particularly high degree of chutzpah.”
Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 597 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment).
34. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2270 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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front door, then the State could sneak it in through the back. What a neat trick – but
really, what a way to run a criminal justice system. No wonder five Justices reject
it.” 35 The plurality’s arguments in support of the reliability of the evidence are met
with a terse and weary rebuttal: “Been there, done that.” 36 Kagan’s rhetorical
strategy in dissent is one of mockery rather than direct assault, using language to
puncture rather than to pummel the opposition’s argument. Toward the end of her
opinion, she concludes that “[w]hat comes out of four Justices’ desire to limit”
precedent on the admissibility issue “is—to be frank—who knows what.” 37 That
frankness, couched in a colloquial expression of bewilderment, speaks directly to
the reader as well as to her fellow Justices.
It is curious that in the same dissent Kagan, for thus far the only time, uses a
remarkably obscure word, one that has never appeared in any other Supreme Court
opinion. Criticizing Justice Thomas’s concurrence, she finds that his “approach, if
accepted, would turn the Confrontation Clause into a constitutional geegaw – nice
for show, but of little value.” 38 “Geegaw” is described in the Oxford English
Dictionary as a variant of “gewgaw” and defined as “a gaudy trifle, plaything, or
ornament, a pretty thing of little value, a toy or bauble.” 39 Kagan has thus selected
not only an obscure word but its even more obscure variant to make her point. The
choice is deliberate: she helpfully provides a definition for the reader who is not
expected either to know the word or to reach for a historical dictionary to find out
what it means. The obscurity is presumably the point, a way of underscoring how
out of step with the Constitution the Thomas approach must be. It is also worth
noting that the expression itself may remind the reader of Justice Marshall’s
famous phrase in McCulloch v. Maryland, where he suggests that an incorrect
interpretation of the Constitution may reduce it to “a splendid bauble.” 40 Kagan‘s
definition – “nice for show, but of little value” – could serve as well for Marshall’s
phrase, and that is unlikely to be merely fortuitous.
When Kagan reaches for similes and metaphors outside the legal sphere to
explain her opinions, she chooses areas of popular culture and sport that are likely
to be familiar to her readers. In her most extended development of one such figure
of speech, she compares litigation to its Hollywood versions:
These standards would be easy to apply if life were like the movies, but
that is usually not the case. In Hollywood, litigation often concludes
with a dramatic verdict that leaves one party fully triumphant and the
other utterly prostrate. The court in such a case would know exactly
how to award fees (even if that anti-climactic scene is generally left on

35. Id. at 2272 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 2275.
37. Id. at 2277.
38. Id. at 2276.
39. Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed., 1989)), vol. 6, p. 489. Kagan displays her taste
for obscure diction in another case, when, in discussing “a crime involving turpitude,” she
uses the adjectival form, “turpitudinous,” a word the Oxford English Dictionary terms
“literary” and that does not appear elsewhere in the U.S. Reports. The New Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary (1993), vol. 2, p. 3429.
40. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819).
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the cutting-room floor). But in the real world, litigation is more
complex, involving multiple claims for relief that implicate a mix of
legal theories and have different merits. Some claims succeed; others
fail. Some charges are frivolous; others (even if not ultimately
successful) have a reasonable basis. In short, litigation is messy, and
courts must deal with untidiness in awarding fees. 41
The analogy is prologue to a resolution that allows civil rights litigants to receive
attorney’s fees for claims that, although unsuccessful, were nonetheless nonfrivolous. On her way to that resolution, Kagan introduces two defendants, “call
them Vice and Rice,” only one of whom faced both frivolous and non-frivolous
claims. 42 She is deliberately blending reality with her fiction, since Vice is the
name of one actual defendant in the case, in order to illustrate the basis for the
Court’s resolution of the “messy” claims issue. Elsewhere, Kagan invokes
television rather than the movies, describing a case as “little more than a rerun” of
the relevant precedent. 43 In a campaign finance case, she reaches for a fairy tale
metaphor to explain that “[t]he difficulty, then, is in finding the Goldilocks solution
– not too large, not too small, but just right.” 44 She introduces a history of
sentencing jurisprudence by noting that “[a]ficionados of our sentencing decisions
will recognize much of the story line.” 45 And she finds that admitting certain
evidence “would end-run the Confrontation Clause, and make a parody of its
strictures.” 46 The submerged theme of such references is that legal opinions are
also, like film and fiction, narratives that are most effective when they engage their
readers.
In the same spirit, Kagan draws on the vocabulary of gambling to illustrate her
points. Describing a circuit split on an issue of immigration law, she notes that,
after two other circuits rejected the Ninth Circuit’s position, it nonetheless
“doubled down on its contrary view.” 47 Explaining the basis for the Court’s
rejection of a litigant’s interpretation of a statute, she relies on poker terms to
conclude “[w]e think that sees, raises, and bests Novo’s argument.” 48 And, in a
recurrent metaphor, she compares the Bureau of Immigration Appeals’ method of
determining whether an alien may be granted discretionary relief from deportation
to a coin toss. “If,” she observes, “the BIA proposed to narrow the class of
deportable aliens eligible to seek § 212(c) relief by flipping a coin – heads an alien
may apply for relief, tails he may not – we would reverse the policy in an
instant.” 49 The statutory distinction relied on is “as extraneous to the merits of the
case as a coin flip would be.” 50 A record of reliance on that policy is unpersuasive

41.
42.
43.
44.
(2011).
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2213-14 (2011).
Id. at 2215.
Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2379 (2011).
Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2832
Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (2011).
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2269 (2012).
Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2016 (2012).
Caraco Pharm. Lab., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1682 (2012).
Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 485 (2011).
Id. at 486.
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support since “([t]o use a prior analogy, flipping coins to determine §212(c)
eligibility would remain as arbitrary on the thousandth try as on the first.”) 51
Finally, she rejects “cheapness” as a rationale to save the policy: “(If it could,
flipping coins would be a valid way to determine an alien’s eligibility for a
waiver.)” 52 By providing a powerful visual image, the coin toss analogy
strengthens the Court’s rejection of what it finds an equally arbitrary decisionmaking method. Attorneys may enjoy, but do not need, such imagery to understand
judicial analyses. Kagan seems to include them in part in the hope that she may
number interested amateurs as well as legal professionals among readers of Court
opinions. 53
Kagan has other strategies of engagement that she frequently uses to underscore
an important point. One of her favorites, the use of parenthetical commentary on
her own argument, has become a signature of her style. These interjections function
like the asides a speaker uses to establish a bond with a listener – a change of tone
that suggests a shared sensibility. Kagan may use these parentheticals to strengthen
a point, as when, writing for the Court to strike down mandatory life sentences
without parole for juveniles, she describes the special nature of children by
referring to “their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environmental
vulnerabilities” 54 and later makes clear the drastic consequence of the rejected
policy by calling it “a sentence of life (and death) in prison.” 55 She questions a
majority assertion by noting that it is made “(without explaining how this can be
true)” 56 and then debunks the majority’s reliance on language from a government
website “(written by who-knows-whom?).” 57 She may use a parenthetical to
highlight for the reader what she considers an indisputable point by adding

51. Id. at 488.
52. Id. at 490.
53. It is not surprising that Kagan, known as a fierce New York Mets fan, also uses
occasional sports imagery, though not always with complete success. She observes that “[a]
trial court has wide discretion when, but only when, it calls the game by the right rules.” Fox
v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2217 (2011). She refers approvingly to “[o]ur more essential point”
that “has less gamesmanship about it.” Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1682. Most emphatically,
though, she recognizes the limits of her own sports imagery when she concludes her
campaign finance dissent by insisting that “[t]ruly, democracy is not a game.” Arizona Free
Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2846. In a particularly vivid dissenting
passage that combines sport and firearms imagery, Kagan builds her charge against the
majority: “As against all this, the majority claims to have found three smoking guns that
reveal the State’s true (and nefarious) intention to level the playing field. But the only smoke
here is the majority’s and it is the kind that goes with mirrors.” Id. at 2843.
On other occasions, Kagan is not quite so successful in avoiding that danger. For
example, immediately after noting that “the Government also emphasizes the comparablegrounds rule’s vintage,” she adds that “[a]s an initial matter, we think this is a slender reed to
support a significant government policy.” Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 488. In the same opinion,
she observes that “the BIA tried to have it both ways” before concluding that “the BIA’s
cases were all over the map.” Id.
54. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012).
55. Id. at 2567.
56. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2840.
57. Id. at 2844.
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energetically “(no controversy there!)” 58 or, in a tone of mild irony, observe that
the Quiet Title Act “concerns (no great surprise) quiet title actions.” 59 The informal
language in these two examples serves to draw writer and reader together in their
shared appreciation of the obvious.
At other times she uses the parenthetical to characterize or qualify her own
position. Criticizing the Court’s admission of laboratory test results without the
analyst’s testimony as a Confrontation Clause violation, she finds that this
“approach – no less (perhaps more) than the confrontation-free methods of
presenting forensic evidence we have formerly banned – deprived” the defendant of
his Sixth Amendment rights. 60 When she compares the test applied in this case to
similar precedent, she finds that any distinction “amounts to (maybe) a nickel’s
worth of difference” and that “the variances are no more (probably less)” than those
the Court has earlier rejected. 61 Here the parenthetical phrases suggest that she is
actually more restrained than she might be in rejecting the Court’s position and thus
a more credible critic. This is the reverse of hyperbole, a deliberate understatement
offered to the reader as a credential of trustworthiness.
Kagan employs another rhetorical strategy, a pedagogic staple for making sure
that an audience is alerted to the important points: the simple but effective device of
repetition. In the juvenile penalty case, she echoes the Court’s earlier language to
refute it, finding that “if, as Harmelin recognized, ‘death is different,’ children are
different too.” 62 She repeatedly makes double use of a word or phrase to drive
home her point: “to avoid avoidance”; 63 “courts should think hard, and then think
hard again”; 64 and “differences that make no difference.” 65 There may be a slight
variation, as in “a sentencing judge may never, ever” 66 or “we have never, not
once,” 67 but the effect is almost identical. More dramatically, a number of these
repetitions are triplets, with the key term used three times in close proximity: “In
First Amendment Law, that difference makes a difference – indeed it makes all the
difference,” 68 and, at greater length, “in authorizing one person to bring one kind of
suit seeking one form of relief, Congress barred another person from bringing
another kind of suit seeking another form of relief.” 69 More simply, in an opinion
pointing out the potential consequences of the Court’s avoidance of certain
qualified immunity claims, Kagan combines two forms of repetition: “Another
plaintiff brings suit, and another court both awards immunity and bypasses the

58. Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1686.
59. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct.
2199, 2206 (2012).
60. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2265.
61. Id. at 2276.
62. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012).
63. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011).
64. Id. at 2032.
65. Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1458 (2011) (Kagan,
J., dissenting).
66. Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2389 (2011).
67. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2837.
68. Id. at 2839.
69. Match-E-Be, 132 S. Ct. at 2209.
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claim. And again, and again, and again.” 70 The effect is to illustrate the substantive
point by embedding it in the rhetorical structure.
These rhetorical devices and diction choices combine to produce the
conversational tone that Kagan has said she works to achieve. In a recent interview
at the University of Richmond School of Law, she was candid about her stylistic
goals. “It’s important that my opinions sound like me,” she told the audience, and
to that end she writes them herself rather than delegating to her law clerks. 71 And
she targets lay readers as well as legal professionals. “I try very hard,” she said of
her opinion writing, “to make it understandable to a broad audience.” 72 She makes
clear that her choice of diction is deliberate. “One way” of achieving her goal, she
has found, is “to drop the legalese and try to express as people would in normal
conversation.” 73 And she often meets that goal. When she feels that her colleagues
on the other side are misinterpreting her dissent, she observes crisply that “the
plurality must be reading someone else’s opinion.” 74 Responding to the majority’s
assumption that the Indiana legislature simply forgot to remove a crucial phrase in
amending a statute, she notes that “if so, the legislature forgot four more times to
correct its error.” 75 These are rejoinders that might easily be heard in ordinary
conversational sparring. Dissenting from the Court’s acceptance of Arizona’s
school tuition tax credit plan, she observes that “[i]t is, after all good fun to spend
other people’s money,” a formulation that would fit comfortably into a family
financial discussion. 76
Although these separate examples of Kagan’s deliberately colloquial style are
engaging, the cumulative effect of her rhetorical strategy can be considerably more
potent. Not surprisingly, that effect appears most emphatically in a spirited dissent
joined by her three liberal colleagues, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.
The issue in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett is the
constitutionality of a state election statute that authorizes the payment of public
funds to a candidate in order to match threshold amounts spent by a privately
financed opponent. 77 Under the state’s Clean Election Act, a publicly financed
candidate receives an initial lump-sum to, as Kagan puts it, “get his campaign off
the ground.” 78 As the candidate’s privately financed opponent spends money on his
campaign, the state matches every dollar with ninety-four cents in public funds, up
to three times the initial lump-sum payment. The dissenters argue that this scheme
is both constitutionally valid and practical as a means of preventing corruption or
its appearance in the election process.
Having set out the substance of the majority’s position—that the matching fund
provision has the prohibited effect of restricting speech by the privately funded

70. Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2031.
71. Interview, supra note 14.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2271 (2012).
75. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2295 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
76. Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1458 (2011) (Kagan
J., dissenting).
77. 131 S. Ct. at 2813.
78. Id. at 2832.
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candidate, since any money he spends will be matched, up to a point, by the state—
Kagan proceeds to dismantle that argument by speaking directly to the reader.
Although she writes for three colleagues, Kagan speaks as an individual, repeatedly
using first person pronouns. Thus, she tells the reader that “I will not quarrel” and
“My guess is” and “I will take on faith.” 79 Even a footnote begins with “I will note”
and continues in the first person voice, as she insists that “I understand” and “I will
not belabor the issue.” 80 It is here that Kagan directly engages the reader as listener,
asking him, in a passage quoted earlier, to “[p]retend that you are financing your
campaign through private donations” and to consider which of two schemes is
preferable. 81 The dissent has now created a conversation of sorts, with the reader
pressed to play an actively responsive role. The exchange ends with Kagan’s “Me
too,” assuming that the reader has agreed with her point that even the privately
financed candidate would choose “mostly” to control the amount his opponent
receives by controlling how much he himself spends. 82
As she concludes this section of her argument, Kagan again relies on the
intelligence—and memory—of the reader, noting that “I doubt that I have to
reiterate that the Arizona statute imposes no restraints on any expressive activity.” 83
She and the reader are by now in perfect agreement. Moreover, the reader is
complimented for the good sense to see through the majority’s weak rationale for
striking down the statute. “If an ordinary citizen,” she observes, “without the
hindrance of a law degree, thought this result an upending of First Amendment
values, he would be correct.” 84 The lay reader is not merely the equal of a majority
Justice in comprehending the way the statute works. He is actually better able to
penetrate the fog of legal argument and grasp the right result precisely because he is
unhampered by the majority’s technical preconceptions. Just as Kagan talks to the
reader in the language of daily life, she also presents legal issues as practical
problems that can be solved without sophisticated jurisprudential expertise. All she
asks of the reader is the application of logic, common sense, and human experience.
It is not surprising that Kagan often uses a similarly pragmatic perspective when
assessing legal standards. Writing for a unanimous Court in Judulang v. Holder 85 to
find the Board of Immigration Appeals’ standard for discretionary relief from
deportation arbitrary and capricious, she again relies on common sense rather than
exclusively on legal exegesis. She opens her analysis by announcing that “[t]he
legal background of this case is complex, but the principle guiding our decision is
anything but.” 86 The syntax of the sentence reinforces its point. The concluding
phrase, “anything but,” is not only colloquial in tone but also grammatically casual
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in its use of a conjunction to end the sentence. She offers no adjective to contrast
with “complex,” trusting the reader to understand her point. It is here that Kagan
uses the coin-flipping analogy discussed earlier to underscore the disturbingly
random quality of the current standard, a problem that even non-lawyers can
readily grasp. 87
In another unanimous opinion, this one finding no abuse of discretion in a
district court’s denial of a prisoner’s request for new counsel, Kagan is faced with
the need “to fill [a] statutory hole” by selecting an appropriate standard for deciding
requests by capital defendants. 88 She rejects the prosecution’s proposed new theory
in favor of applying the existing capital standard to non-capital defendants.
“Inventiveness is often an admirable quality,” she observes, “but here we think the
State overdoes it.” 89 Instead, “we prefer to copy something familiar than concoct
something novel.” 90 The pairing of the two alliterative verbs—the straightforward
“copy” with the pejorative “concoct”—alerts the reader to the contrast between the
two strategies. Where one prudently adopts an established test, the other invents a
new test that may prove to have unexpected consequences. These epigrammatic
comments reflect Kagan’s belief that even technical legal issues can often be both
resolved and expressed without resort to needlessly complicated formulations. Her
diction reinforces her point: the prosecution “overdoes it” by introducing an
unnecessary risk while the unanimous Court chooses the simpler and safer course.
Through her rhetorical strategies, Kagan has accomplished a feat in her first two
Court terms that few of the Court’s Justices have matched. Adapting the classroom
techniques that engage students by speaking to them in familiar diction and
imagery, Kagan has crafted a voice that reaches not only those trained in the law
but also those interested in its impact on their lives and their society. Just as she
used humor to build bridges at her confirmation hearing, she now uses her
colloquial style to put a human face on what, in the absence of cameras in the
courtroom, has largely remained an aloof and austere institution. As Jeffrey Rosen,
an early Kagan admirer, puts it, “her dissents often read like a really good New
York Times op-ed.” 91 Like that really good op-ed, her opinions bridge the gap
between legal doctrine and its practical consequences for her readers, allowing the
Court’s broad national constituency of non-lawyers to grasp both the reasoning and
the result of its decisions. If, as Kagan intends, her style allows her to reach lay
readers, the Court’s most junior Justice may well turn out to be its most effective
communicator, a valuable link between those who decide the law and those who are
bound by it.
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